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THE FATE OF SHAREHOLDERS OF CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS IN THE WAKE OF BILY V. ARTHUR YOUNG
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the California Supreme Court struck a blow to notions of eq-
uity and fairness' when it narrowed the scope of duty owed by independent
auditors to certain affiliated third parties.2 In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,
the court required strict privity of contract in professional negligence ac-
tions against independent auditors.3 The unfortunate result is that, at least in
California, shareholders of small closely held corporations4 may be barred
from suing an auditor hired by their corporation to independently audit the
corporation's financial statements.5 While the court's reasoning in Bily may
apply to some types of third parties,6 the reasoning does not support its ap-
1. By equity and fairness, I mean that in certain circumstances, the court should look to
"what is fair in a particular situation" rather than following "strictly formulated rules of
common law." See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 767 (Cal. 1992). In deciding Bily, the
court reversed its earlier decision in International Mortgage v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (Cal. CL App. 1986) (holding an auditor owes a duty of care
to anyone who "reasonably and foreseeably" relies on the audited financial statements).
"Third party" refers to any party not in privity of contract with the independent auditor.
3. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 767. Independent auditors are outside accountants, generally
Certified Public Accountants ("CPA"), hired by corporations to audit their financial state-
ments. An audit is an independent verification of the financial statements and accounting
practices of the business entity consisting of a thorough "examination of the underlying ac-
counting records and supporting evidence' Bily, 834 P.2d at 749 (citing Willis W. Hagan,
Certified Public Accountant's Liability for Malpractice: Effect of Compliance with GAAP
and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. LAW 65, 66 (1987)). Independent auditors review the financial
statements prepared by a company and issue opinions indicating whether the financial state-
ments accurately represent the financial status of the company. Bily, 834 P.2d at 749 (citing
John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86
MIfcH. L. REV. 1929, 1931 (1988)).
4. Generally, closely held corporations are corporations with a small number of share-
holders whose shares are not bought or sold in a market Of course, there is no single defini-
tion of them. See infra Part III for a more detailed discussion of closely held corporations.
Here, the term "small" refers to the number of shareholders.
5. The Bily court indicated in its opinion that shareholders not in privity may sue under a
theory of "negligent misrepresentation." Bily, 834 P.2d at 7670. The court recognized the
distinctions, both statutory and practical, between the torts of negligence and negligent mis-
representation. Id. This article focuses only on the tort of negligence.
6. For example, the reasoning makes sense when applied to shareholders of publicly held
corporations, like the investor shareholders in Bily. The differences between publicly held
and closely held corporations are the focus of this paper. See infra Part III.
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plication to shareholders of small closely held corporations.7 As this paper
will discuss, there are major differences between the shareholders of public
and small closely held corporations that justify different treatment.8
One case that illustrates the inherent unfairness of the Bily decision is
the case of Mr. and Mrs. Smith. Mr. and Mrs. Smith (the "Smiths") along
with the Smith Family Trusts ("Family Trusts")(collectively referred to as
"Plaintiffs") were the only shareholders of a closely held Subchapter S' cor-
poration called Re-Comp.' ° After owning and operating Re-Comp for five
years and generating millions of dollars in sales, Plaintiffs decided to sell
their company. Knowing most potential buyers would require audited fi-
nancial statements, Re-Comp engaged the services of a "Big Six"'" ac-
counting firm ("Accountants") to audit Re-Comp's financial statements.
Accountants and Re-Comp entered into a written audit agreement. Re-
Comp informed Accountants that the purpose of the audit was to prepare
Re-Comp for sale. Re-Comp was not a public corporation and was there-
fore not required to have audited financial statements for SEC filings. 2
Therefore, Accountants knew, or should have known, that the reason for
auditing the financial statements was in connection with the impending sale
of Re-Comp. Additionally, Accountants knew Re-Comp was a Subchapter
S corporation. It is reasonable to infer that Accountants knew the Smiths, as
7. The Court's rationale in Bily is discussed infra Part II.D.
8. See infra Part ImI for a discussion of the differences.
9. Subchapter S is a tax election status available to closely held corporations that meet
the statutory criteria. Basically, the corporation's profits and losses "pass through" the share-
holders and are taxed at the individual rate, rather than the corporate rate. See 1 WILUAM H.
PAINrER, PAINTER ON CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 1.10.1-.3 (3d ed. 1991); ZOLMAN CAVrrCH &
MATTsw P. CAVrTCH, TAX PLONINcs FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS §§ 3.00, 3.01
(2d ed. 1996 & Supp 1997).
10. The situation involving the Smiths describes a case filed in San Diego County Supe-
rior Court (the "Smith case"). The names of all parties have been changed. The background
information and the court's findings were taken both from the court's files (i.e., Plaintiffs'
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment) and from conversations with Plaintiffs'
attorneys.
11. At the time the Smith case was pending, the six largest accounting firms, in terms of
size, were referred to as the 'Sig Six." Those firms were: Arthur Anderson LLP, Ernst &
Young LLP, DeLoitte & Touche LLP, KPMG Peat Marwick, Coopers & Lybrand and Price
Waterhouse. However, in September 1997, Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse an-
nounced plans to merge. See Accounting's Colossus, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 29, 1997, at 53.
Additionally, in October 1997, Ernst & Young and KPMG Peat Marwick announced plans to
merge. See James Bernstein, Peat Marwick to Join With Ernst & Young, NEWsDAY, Oct. 21,
1997, at A54. If both mergers go through, the remaining firms would be known as the "Big
Four."
12. The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994)) (the "1933 Act") and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994)) (the "1934 Act") were
created to protect the public from fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of securities. These
statutes require the corporation to file a "registration" statement with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") before the stock can be sold. Full disclosure is the ultimate
goal. As a result, publicly traded companies are required to file their audited financial state-
ments with the SEC annually and quarterly, unless they qualify for an exemption under the
1934 Act. SEC regulations are extremely complex and are beyond the scope of this article.
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individuals, would rely on the accuracy of the audited financial statements
for preparation of their individual and Family Trust tax returns. Account-
ants then conducted three separate audits and represented each time, without
exception, that Re-Comp's financial statements conformed to GAAP.'3
Based on Accountants' representations, Plaintiffs represented and war-
ranted to Re-Comp's purchasers ("Purchasers") that Re-Comp's financial
statements conformed to GAAP and sold Re-Comp for $25 million. After
the sale, Purchasers' auditors (another "Big Six" firm), while attempting to
audit Re-Comp's financial statements, discovered that the prior audited fi-
nancial statements were not in accordance with GAAP.
Purchasers then sued Plaintiffs for breach of warranty. In binding judi-
cial arbitration, Purchasers were awarded almost $5 million in damages.
Plaintiffs then sued Accountants for professional negligence. Amazingly,
the trial court granted Accountants' Motion for Summary Judgment against
Plaintiffs. The trial court, citing Bily, held that Plaintiffs lacked privity of
contract and therefore could not maintain a cause of action for malpractice
against Accountants. 4
As a result, Accountants were completely exonerated from liability for
their professional negligence. The sole reason: lack of strict privity of con-
tract between Accountants and Plaintiffs. While Accountants and Re-Comp
were in privity of contract, Accountants could not be held liable to Re-
Comp because Re-Comp suffered no loss." Notwithstanding the fact that
Accountants and Purchasers were not in privity of contract, Purchasers have
already "been made whole" by collecting the judgment against Plaintiffs.
As a consequence, Accountants could not be liable to Purchasers either. It
13. Generally, in the audit report or opinion, the auditing firm states that it has examined
the financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards
("GAAS"). GAAS sets out the audit standards and general principles and procedures "that
guide the audit function." The audit opinion also includes a statement that the audited fiman-
cial statements conform with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") and accu-
rately represent the financial position of the corporation. "GAAP include[s] broad statements
of accounting principles" which range from "aspirational norms" to "more specific guide-
lines." Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750 (Cal. 1992). The auditor should
"qualify" the opinion if any aspects of the financial statements do not conform to GAAP or if
there are "uncertainties which might affect a fair evaluation of the statements". The audit
opinion should also contain a disclaimer if the auditor is unable to express an opinion. Fi-
nally, the audit opinion may affirmatively state that the financial statements do not fairly rep-
resent the financial position of the corporation in conformance with GAAP. Id at 751.
14. Plaintiffs also sued Accountants for negligent misrepresentation. Under a separate
motion, the trial court granted Accountants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the negligent
misrepresentation cause of action, finding there was no triable issue of fact regarding the is-
sue of reliance. Plaintiffs are appealing this issue on other grounds and it will not be dis-
cussed in this article.
15. A dissolved corporation continues to exist for purposes of prosecuting and defending
lawsuits. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997). However, in this case,
Re-Comp, the business entity, suffered no loss because only Plaintiffs were liable to Purchas-
ers for the breach of warranty. Therefore, Re-Comp could not maintain an action for dam-
ages.
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is unfair that Accountants are not responsible for their negligence merely
because of the fiction of the corporate entity.
This article addresses the special concerns of independent auditor li-
ability to shareholders of closely held corporations. First, this article ex-
plores the history of independent auditor liability and the California Su-
preme Court's reasoning behind the Bily decision. By distinguishing the
"Smith case" from Bily, this article explores the prospect that Bily does not
apply to the shareholders of closely held corporations. The Bily rationale
makes no sense when applied to the Smith case. Second, this article exam-
ines the differences between closely held corporations and publicly held
corporations. It is precisely because of these differences that the Bily deci-
sion should not apply to the shareholders of close corporations in denying
standing to sue. Third, this article explores the prospect that Bily may apply
to the shareholders of closely held corporations, but that the equitable doc-
trine of "reverse" piercing of the corporate veil allows the shareholders to
disregard the corporate entity so that the shareholder is in privity of con-
tract.
II. HISTORY OF AUDITOR LIABILITY
Before analyzing the implications of Bily to shareholders of closely
held corporations, it is best to examine the history of auditor liability.6 A
16. There have been numerous scholarly articles written on the issue of auditor liability
since the California Supreme Court's decision in Bily. These articles mainly discuss the his-
tory of auditor liability and offer alternative approaches to liability. However, none of these
articles recognize or consider the distinctions between shareholders of closely held and pub-
licly held corporations which justify different treatment under the rule espoused in Bily. See,
e.g., Jodi S. Scherl, Comment, Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual Third Par-
ties: Balancing the Equities and Weighing the Consequences, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 255, 265-77
(1994) (urging adoption of reasonably foreseeable approach and calling for legislation);
Denise M. Orlinski, An Accountant's Liability to Third Parties: Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,
43 DEPAUL L. REv. 859, 871-87 (1994) (urging adoption of reasonably foreseeable ap-
proach); Anne T. Prillman, Comment, Countering Unrealistic Expectations: Limiting Audi-
tors' Liability to Investors, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 849, 853-56 (1994) (arguing Bily was correctly
decided); Thomas G. Mackey, Note, Accountants' Liability After Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co.: A More Equitable Proposal for Third Party Recovery, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 147, 152 (1993)
(urging adoption of reasonably foreseeable and proportional liability and also calling for leg-
islation); Scott Vick, Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.: Is Limiting Auditor Liability to Third Par-
ties Favoritism or Fair Play, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1335, 1346-50 (1993) (arguing Bily was
correctly decided); John M. Gibson, The Delineation of Accountants' Legal Liability to Third
Parties: Bily & Beyond, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 609, 617-29 (1994) (arguing Bily was cor-
rectly decided); Richard S. Panttaja, Accountants' Duty to Third Parties: A Search for a Fair
Doctrine of Liability, 23 STTsoN L. REv. 927, 938-45 (1994) (urging adoption of reasonably
foreseeable approach and proportional liability); David A. Jaffe, Comment, The Allocation of
Fault in Auditor Liability Lawsuits Brought by Sophisticated Third Party Users of Financial
Statements-A Plea for Proportionate Liability, 54 U. PIT. L. REV. 1051, 1061-64 (1993)
(urging adoption of proportional liability); Lewis P. Checchia, Accountants' Liability to
Third Parties Under Bily v. Arthur Young & Company: Does a Watchdog Need Protection,
38 VILL. L. REV. 249, 256-67 (1993) (urging adoption of reasonably foreseeable approach);
Doria Bonham-Yeaman & James John Jurinski, Auditors' Liability to Third Parties: Can the
[Vol. 34
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review of the history is important because of the complex nature and eco-
nomic implications of the audit function.17
The jurisdictions determine auditor liability using one of three basic
approaches: (1) Privity of Relationship; (2) Negligent Misrepresentation;3
and (3) Reasonable Foreseeability.
A. Privity of Relationship
At least twelve jurisdictions require privity of relationship as a basis for
finding independent auditor liability. 9 The Court of Appeals of New York
first referenced privity of relationship in its decision in Ultramares v.
Touche.? In his majority opinion, Justice Cardozo expressed concern about
exposing accountants to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class."'" In following Ultramares and its
progeny, that court has found the equivalent of a privity relationship be-
tween an independent auditor and the plaintiff.' In White v. Guarente, a
limited partnership hired an auditor to perform auditing and tax return serv-
ices.' The plaintiff, one of a group of many limited partners, sued the
auditor in negligence for failing to report that various partners were with-
drawing funds "from their capital accounts in violation of the partnership
agreement." 4 The court held that the limited partner could sue the auditors
for malpractice because he was "one of a settled and particularized class"
and not a member of the public at large.' While not expressly finding priv-
ity per se, the court focused on the fact that the auditing services were not
rendered to a "faceless" group of people, but were rendered to a "known
group ... marked by a definable limit."
However, in Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson & Co., the court modi-
States Adopt a Unified Approach?, 22 W. ST. U. L. REv. 37, 45-55 (1994) (urging adoption
of uniform approach arguing privity is theoretically the best, but reasonably foreseeable ap-
proach is practically better).
17. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 752.
18. This is also referred to as the "Restatement approach" or the "actual foreseeability"
approach. See infra Part ll.B.
19. Jurisdictions which require privity or near privity rules include: Colorado, Delaware,
Idaho, Nebraska, New York, and Pennsylvania (by judicial opinion) and Arkansas, Illinois,
Kansas, New Jersey and Utah (by statute). See Bily, 834 P.2d at 755 & nn. 4-5. See also
First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053, 1059 n. 8 (5th Cir.
1990). Alabama operated under privity rules until 1994. See Scherl, supra note 16, at 264.
New Jersey recently adopted a statute requiring privity. See infra note 40 and accompanying
text.
20. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
21. Id at 444. See also Mackey, supra note 16.
22. See White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319-20 (N.Y. 1977).
23. See id at 317.
24. Id at 317-18.
25. Id at 318-20.
26. Id at318.
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fled Ultramares and White and developed a three-prong test for determining
when a third party not in strict pfivity may recover.' The test required that:
(1) the accountants know that the financial reports are to be used for a par-
ticular purpose; (2) the accountants know the third party who intends to rely
on the report; and (3) there be presence of some "linking conduct" on the
part of the accountants which manifests the auditor's understanding of the
known third party's reliance on the audited material.2 If all three elements
are met, the relationship is "sufficiently approaching privity' 2' and the third
party may maintain a cause of action against an auditor.
B. Negligent Misrepresentation
At least seventeen 0 jurisdictions follow the Restatement (Second) of
Torts approach, making it the majority view." Under the majority approach,
27. See Mackey, supra note 16, at 153 (citing Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985)).
28. See Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 118. "Linking conduct" includes "direct deal-
ings" with the third party, or "word or action" by auditor toward the third party. It also refers
to any reference to the third party in the retainer agreement. See id at 119. While the court
did not find the requisite "linking conduct" in the Credit Alliance case, it did find such
"linking conduct" in the companion case European American Bank and Trust Co. v. Strauhs
& Kaye, 483 N.E.2d 110, 120 (N.Y. 1985). In European Bank, the court found that the
auditors were aware that the primary, if not exclusive, end aim of the audit was to provide the
third party with financial information. Additionally, the auditor and third party were in direct
communications, both orally and in writing, and met together numerous times to discuss the
client's financial condition. The court concluded that "the parties' direct communications
and personal meetings resulted in a nexus between them sufficiently approaching privity" to
permit a cause of action. See id at 120.
29. Security Pacific Business Credit v. Peat Marwick, 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1081 (N.Y.
1992). In Security Pacific, the court found that a lender who relied on an auditor's valuation
of the lender's client in making a loan did not have privity with the auditor. See id. Using
the Credit Alliance factors, the court found: (1) no evidence that auditor was hired for the
purpose of inducing the lender to extend credit; (2) one phone call to the auditor was not akin
to "multiple, direct, and substantive communications and personal meetings" which would
"sufficiently approach privity"; (3) no evidence that the auditor shaped its opinion to meet
any specific needs of the lender; and (4) no evidence that auditor agreed to furnish or directly
furnished the lender with a copy of the audit report. See id at 1085-86.
30. Jurisdictions that follow this approach include: Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and
West Virginia. See First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053,
1060 n.12 (5th Cir. 1990); Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745, 757 n.7 (Cal. 1992). See
also Scherl, supra note 16, at 264 & n.56.
31. RFsTATE MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Section 552 of the Restatement
provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transaction,
is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
6
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a third party may recover under the theory of negligent misrepresentation
when the auditor either (1) intended to influence a third party to rely on the
audit, or (2) knew his client intended to influence a specific third party to
rely on the audit. 2 A growing number of states follow this approach be-
cause they view the privity approach as too restrictive?3 For example, the
Ohio Supreme Court finds the privity approach too restrictive because it ig-
nores the fact that accountants "make reports on which people other than
their clients foreseeably rely in the ordinary course of business.' 4 In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court of North Carolina finds privity too restrictive be-
cause of the need to hold independent auditors accountable. 5 Under this
view, privity is not required and as long as the Restatement elements are
met, the third party can sue an independent auditor.
C. Reasonable Foreseeability
Finally, some jurisdictions follow the "reasonable foreseeability" ap-
proach.6 Under this approach, the court considers whether the harm done to
the third party was reasonably foreseeable to the auditory The rationale is
that if accountants have "such an important role in the financial community,
the artificial privity requirement cannot stand and the limitations on third
party recovery under Restatement (Second) are arbitrary and unnecessary."3
Until recently, New Jersey followed this approach. In Rosenblum v.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection
(1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group
of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the in-
formation or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substan-
tially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the informa-
tion extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose
benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is in-
tended to protect them.
32. See id.
33. See Mackey, supra note 16, at 155.
34. I& at 155 (citing Haddon View Inc. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214
(Ohio 1982)) (holding limited partners belonged to a limited group of persons whose reliance
on auditor's representations was foreseen).
35. Id at 155 (citing Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d
609, 617 (N.C. 1988)) (holding liability of accountants should extend to any "person, or one
of a group of persons, whom the accountant or his client intends the information to benefit").
36. Wisconsin and Mississippi are currently the only two jurisdictions that follow this
approach. The court in Bily referred to four states who explicitly rejected this approach in
lieu of the Restatement Second approach. These states are: Florida, North Carolina, West
Virginia and Washington. See Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745, 757 n.7 (Cal. 1992).
37. See Mackey, supra note 16, at 155.
38. Id- at 155-56 (citing International Mortgage v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.,
223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
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Adler 9 the Supreme Court of New Jersey found no reason to deny third
party users of financial statements recovery for economic loss resulting
from an auditor's negligent misrepresentation. The court commented that
the basis for holding auditors liable to those who foreseeably rely on audited
financial statements includes the ability of the accounting firm to obtain
malpractice insurance and the public policy of encouraging diligence in
conducting audits.' This was also the law in California until August 1992,
when the California Supreme Court took a step (or even two) back in time."
In the years before Bily, California followed the "reasonably foresee-
able" approach circumscribed by the California Court of Appeal in Interna-
tional Mortgage v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.42 In deciding Inter-
national Mortgage, the court departed from the long-standing privity
requirement and found that the rule was no longer applicable in light of
more recent decisions43 and the modem role of the independent auditor in
39. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
40. See id, at 151-52. However, in 1995, the New Jersey legislature statutorily created a
duty of care for auditors which does not comport with the judicial decision in Rosenblum.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-25 (West Supp. 1997). The statute appears to mimic the lan-
guage of the Court of Appeal of New York's decision in Credit Alliance.
41. The California Supreme Court decided Bily on August 27, 1992. As a matter of in-
terest, the California Trial Lawyers Association ("CTLA") and banking lobby anticipated the
Bily decision and engaged the help of a California state senator to introduce a bill that would
reverse Bily. See Vick, supra note 16. The proposed amendment to California Business &
Professions Code § 5024 provided: "[a] licensee owes a duty of ordinary care and shall be
liable to reasonably foreseeable persons for his or her negligence or other tortious conduct."
S. 1900, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992) (amended in Assembly August 31, 1992). Unfortu-
nately, the bill was an amendment to a bill dealing with mosquito abatement. While the bill
seemed to be on its way to passage, it died in the Senate after one senator objected because
the amendment violated a state law that amendments must be germane to the original bill.
See Vick, supra note 16, at 1372. Reportedly, there were plans to introduce another bill, but
apparently there have been no such recent efforts. See id. at 1372 (citing Bill Ainsworth,
Capitol Abuzz Over Accountants: Trial Lawyers Acted Fast to Restore Auditor Liability Fol-
lowing Thursday Ruling but Lost on Technicality, THE RECORDER, Sept. 3, 1992, at 1).
42. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 218. In International Mortgage, the court
held that as long as the client was using the audit for a "proper business purpose" the audi-
tor's lack of knowledge of the "precise use" did not erase their duty. Id. at 226.
43. See id. at 221 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958)). In Biakanja, the
court abandoned the privity rule, opting instead for a balancing test when determining liabil-
ity of a notary public to the intended beneficiary of a will. The court looked at the following
factors: (1) extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) foresee-
ability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury; (4) close-
ness of the connection between defendant's conduct and the injury; (5) moral blame attached
to defendant's conduct; and (6) policy of preventing future harm. See id at 221 (citing
Biakanja, 49 Cal.2d at 650). See also Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)
(recognizing the "liberalization" of liability for negligence committed in the performance of a
contract).
The ultimate demise of the privity rule in California was recognized in Heyer v. Flaig,
449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969) (overruled on other grounds by Laird v. Blacker, 828 P.2d 691
(Cal. 1992)); see International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 222. In Heyer, the court held that
an attorney was liable to the intended beneficiaries of an improperly drafted will. Heyer, 449
P.2d at 161; see International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 222. The court found that "public
8
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society." Two California district court decisions subsequently limited the
International Mortgage decision to independent auditors and only in situa-
tions where the plaintiff actually received and relied on the information in
the audit.'
D. The Bily Decision
Under the Bily decision, only the "client" who signs the auditing
agreement with the independent auditor may file an action for professional
negligence." In Bily, Osborne Computer Corporation hired the defendant,
Arthur Young, to prepare an audit in connection with the issuance of war-
rants. 7 Osborne offered warrants to investors in order to raise money until
its public offering.' One of the plaintiffs, Bily, was a director of the com-
pany who had purchased stock from the company's founder." Due to
changes in the market, sales plummeted and the public offering never hap-
pened."s As a result, Bily and other investors lost money."s Bily and the
other investors then sued Arthur Young for professional negligence, negli-
gent misrepresentation and fraud.'2 The investors were denied recovery be-
cause they were not "clients" of Arthur Young.'
In Bily, the California Supreme Court limited independent auditor li-
ability for professional malpractice (general negligence) in conducting
audits "to the client [, i.e., the person who contracts for or engages the audit
services."' ' In so holding, the court required strict privity of contract be-
policy requires that attorneys exercise their positions of trust and superior knowledge respon-
sibly so as not to affect adversely persons whose rights and interests are certain and foresee-
able." International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (citing Heyer, 449 P.2d at 165).
44. See International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
45. See Moskowitz v. Vitalink Comm. Corp., 751 F. Supp. 155, 161 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(International Mortgage does not extend to "aftermarket" statements made by officers of
public corporations and is limited to independent auditors because of independent auditors'
unique public function which is not parallel to corporations' obligations towards prospective
shareholders); In re Wyse Technology, 744 F. Supp. 207, 209-10 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (plaintiff
must allege actual receipt of and reliance on auditor's opinion).
46. Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745,767 (Cal. 1992).
47. These warrants were sold to investors in return for loans or lines of credit. "The
warrants entitled [the] holders to purchase blocks of the company's stock at favorable prices.
when the public offering took place." IL at 747.
48. Id In a public offering, shares of a corporation are offered for sale to the general
public. Public offerings are governed by state and federal securities regulations (e.g., the
1933 Act and 1934 Act).
49. See id
50. See id. at 748.
51. Bily invested $1.5 million. The jury awarded $4.3 million in compensatory dam-
ages, which was approximately 75% of all investments made. See icL at 747-49.
52. See iUL at 748-49.
53. See id. at 767.
54. Industrial Indemnity v. Touche Ross, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(citing Bily, 834 P.2d at 767).
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tween the client and the auditor. In a footnote, the Bily court further stated
that an auditor could be liable to an "express" third party beneficiary of the
engagement letter (i.e., contract) under certain circumstances. 5
In its decision, the Bily court distinguished an action for professional
negligence from an action for negligent misrepresentation.6 Although the
BUy court required strict privity to maintain an action for professional negli-
gence, the court followed section 552 of the Restatement (Second) Torts in
assessing liability for negligent misrepresentation.- Under section 552, an
auditor is liable to a third party if the auditor had actual knowledge of the
third party intended to rely on the audit.58
In its decision, the Bily court identified three public policy reasons for
holding that an action for professional negligence lies only with one in priv-
ity with the professional: (1) the potential for disproportionate liability; (2)
typical third parties are sophisticated enough to conduct their own audits;
and (3) the advantages of the foreseeability approach are unlikely to occur.59
These policy considerations are not relevant when applied to the Smith case
and actions involving other closely held business entities.
First, the Bily court was concerned with the potential for liability to be
out of proportion to fault.' The Bily court found that limiting third party
negligence suits only by foreseeability raised the potential for "multibillion
dollar professional liability" which is out of proportion to (1) the fault of the
auditor and (2) the connection between the auditor's conduct and the third
party's injury.1 The Bily court also focused on the secondary aspect of the
auditor (i.e., the auditor reviews only already prepared financial state-
ments) and the possibility that the auditor may not have been aware of the
existence, nature or scope of the third party transaction that gave rise to the
claim.63 In the Smith case, however, there is a direct connection between
Accountants' negligence and the Plaintiffs' injury.' Not only were Ac-
countants aware of the existence of the third party transaction, they knew
the proposed sale transaction was the express purpose of the audit contracts.
55. The court will consider these "certain circumstances" only when the third party is
expressly identified in the contract. Since the contract in Bily did not identify any third party
beneficiary, the court did not consider the circumstances that would permit recovery as
"clients." See Bily, 834 P.2d at 767 n.16.
56. "Negligent misrepresentation is a separate and distinct tort, a species of the tort of
deceit." Bily, 834 P.2d at 768.
57. The Bily court also cited the factors stated in Biakanja v. Irving in assessing negli-
gent misrepresentation. See Biankaja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 16 (Cal. 1958); see also supra
note 43.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §552 (1977); see supra note 31 for the full text.
59. See Orlinski, supra note 16, at 891-92.
60. Bily, 834 P.2d at 762.
61. 1& at764.
62. See Ud at 749.
63. See id. at 763.
64. This information was taken from "Plaintiffs' Opposition to Accountants' Motion for
Summary Judgment" filed in the San Diego Superior Court. See supra note 10.
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As a direct cause of Accountants' negligent audit, Plaintiffs lost $5 million.
Second, the Bily court felt that third parties should be encouraged to
obtain their own independent audits of companies prior to their investment. 5
In the Smith case, this notion of "private ordering"' is ludicrous because the
alleged third parties, Plaintiffs, were the company.' There were only four
shareholders. It would be absurd to require Plaintiffs to obtain a second in-
dependent audit of their own company when, in essence, they hired Ac-
countants to do the audit.'
Third, the Bily court felt that the advantages of the "foreseeability ap-
proach" were not likely to occur if liability was expanded.' The
"foreseeability approach" fosters the policy of encouraging the careful
preparation of audits." The Bily court discounted this view based on a lack
of empirical evidence and the belief that "deleterious economic effects"
were just as likely to occur.71 However, like the Smith case, if no liability is
imposed, then Accountants will be immune from all liability because no one
has privity. As a result, Accountants will have less incentive to careftflly
prepare audits. Accountants will know that if a corporation hires it for the
purpose of selling the corporation and the corporation's shareholders do not
sign the engagement letter, then Accountants will have no liability for neg-
ligently prepared audits.
In the Smith case, Re-Comp suffered no loss. Only Plaintiffs were li-
able for breach of warranty to Purchasers. Under Bily, Re-Comp is the only
entity that would have a valid claim, yet it suffered no loss.72 On the other
hand, Plaintiffs suffered a $5 million loss, but do not have a claim under
Bily. It is neither fair nor equitable to deny Plaintiffs the right to seek re-
65. Bily, 834 P.2d at 764.
66. The court refers to "private ordering" as the ability of third parties to use their own
resources to verify the client's financial statements by hiring their own independent auditor to
perform an audit on their behalf. See L at 765.
67. See supra note 64.
68. See supra note 64.
69. The major advantage of the foreseeability approach is that it deters negligent conduct
by holding auditors liable to all who are foreseeably injured by the negligent audit. See Bily,
834 P.2d at 765-66.
70. See iL at 765.
71. In focusing on the deterrent effect of a rule of greater liability, the court cites a legal
economist stating: "The deterrent effect of liability rules is the difference between the prob-
ability of incurring liability when performance meets the required standard and the probabil-
ity of incurring liability when performance is below the required standard. Thus, the stronger
the probability that liability will be incurred when performance is adequate, the weaker is the
deterrent effect of liability rules." Id at 765-66 (citing Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of
Accounting: Some Economic Issues, 52 BROOK. L. Rsv. 1051, 1055 (1987)).
72. As one British court stated when dealing with privity in estate planning contracts,
"[the only person who has a valid claim has suffered no loss, and the only person who has
suffered a loss, has no valid claim." JESSE DunINmR & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 65 (5th ed. 1995) (citing Ross v. Caunters, 1 Ch. 297, 299, 3 All. E.R.
580, 582 (1980)). While this refers to attorney malpractice in estate planning, it is equally
relevant here.
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covery of their damages from Accountants whose negligence caused their
injury.
While it is clear that Bily should not preclude a finding of liability un-
der the specific facts of the Smith case, the Smith analysis would apply to
all shareholders of closely held corporations. As I will discuss below, there
are major differences between closely held corporations and larger publicly
held corporations. It is because of these differences that courts should con-
sider shareholders of closely held corporations to be either clients or express
third party beneficiaries, both of which would have standing to sue auditors
for professional negligence. This is especially true when there are a small
number of individual shareholders or family members who comprise the
group of shareholders.' However, even if not considered "clients" under
Bily, equity would require a reverse "piercing of the corporate veil" to pro-
tect such shareholder interests.
III. CLOSELY HELD VS. PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS
A review of California's auditor liability history does not reveal a sin-
gle case involving facts similar to the Smith case described above. In no in-
stance has a California appellate court been asked to consider either the vast
difference between small closely held corporations and large publicly held
corporations or the significantly different relationships of shareholders in
each. Because of these differences, it is more equitable to hold independent
auditors liable for their actions, at least in instances where the shareholders
are easily identifiable and limited in number.
Closely held corporations74 differ from publicly held corporations in
many ways.7' The major functional differences are found in the number of
shareholders and in the degree of involvement of shareholders in the man-
agement of the corporation." While there is no consensus as to a definition
73. This is contrasted to closely held corporations wherein the shareholders consist of
other corporate entities. Although the same arguments for different treatment could be made,
the possibility of finding privity is more attenuated because of the corporate nature of the
shareholders. As a result, the issue of corporate shareholders of closely held corporations
will not be addressed in this article.
74. There is a distinction between statutory "close corporations" and "closely held" cor-
porations. Statutory "close corporations" are corporations that incorporate under California
Corporations Code § 158 that have thirty-five or less shareholders, and who designate them-
selves as a "close corporation" in their articles of incorporation. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a)
(West 1990). "Closely held" corporations have thirty-five or less shareholders, but have not
designated themselves as a "close corporation" in their articles of incorporation. Don Berger,
Protection of Shareholder Interests in California Closely Held & Statutory Close Corpora-
tions: A Practitioner's Guide, 20 PAc. L.L 1127, 1128-29 n.1 (1989). However, for the pur-
poses of this article "close corporation" and "closely held corporation" refers to the same type
of business entity.
75. Berger, supra note 74, at 1128-29 n.1.
76. Id. See also 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS §§ 1.02, 1.08 (3d ed. 1996).
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of a closely held corporation, all such entities have the following basic char-
acteristics: (1) a small number of shareholders; (2) no ready market for the
company's stock; and (3) heavy involvement by majority shareholders in
the management, direction and operation of the corporation.n The share-
holder in a closely held corporation generally feels as if he is in a partner-
ship and considers himself an owner.79 A common situation resulting in the
formation of a close corporation is the incorporation of the "family" busi-
ness. 9 Because of the unity of management and ownership in a closely held
corporation, both decision making and economic risks fall on the sharehold-
ers.
80
Publicly held corporations, on the other hand, have a large number of
shareholders whose shares are either traded on a national securities ex-
change81 or regularly traded on the "over-the-counter" 2 market. 3 The cor-
porate shareholders are generally only investors and do not manage the day
to day operations of the company.' Those shareholders are not personally
responsible for the business decisions made by the company.' Rather, they
only bear an economic risk of loss of their investment. Only the directors
and officers, who may or may not be shareholders, bear the personal risk of
their business decisions." As a result, shareholders of closely held corpora-
tions bear greater overall personal risk than shareholders of publicly held
corporations due to the unity of management and ownership.' Because of
this increased risk-bearing responsibility, shareholders of closely held cor-
porations should not be limited in their actions against independent auditors
for their negligence by the same rules of privity as the shareholders of pub-
licly held corporations.
Indeed, in other instances the courts recognize the special considera-
77. See JAMES D. COXErAL., 2 CORPORATIONS, § 14.1 (1995).
78. O'NEAL& THOMPSON, supra note 76, §1.08.
79. See id. § 1.05.
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, Inc.
("NASDAQ"); NASDAQ is an automated "information system which gives [stock] price
quotations on securities traded over-the-counter to brokers and dealers." BLACK'S LAW
DIcIONARY 1024 (6th ed. 1990).
82. The "over the counter" market is a "broad securities market consisting of brokers
who [buy] or sell securities by computer hook-up or telephone rather than through the facili-
ties of a securities exchange." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (6th ed. 1990).
83. See COXE'AL., supra note 77, § 1.20.
84, See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 76, § 1.08.
85. See ict
86. See id.
87. Generally, the risks are greater in a closely held corporation because most, if not all,
of the shareholder's income is derived through his or her employment with the company. See
O'NFAL & THOMpsON, supra note 76, § 1.08. If the company fails, then the shareholder's
livelihood also fails. Compare this to the shareholder of the publicly held corporation who is,
for the most part, merely an investor and only concerned with profits. See iU
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tions of closely held corporations.88 In the mid-1960s, most courts thought
that all corporations should be governed by the same rules set forth in the
corporation statutes and that no special rules should be developed for
closely held corporations." However, shortly thereafter several dissenting
opinions urged a more "realistic treatment" of closely held corporations. 0
These decisions recognized the need for (1) heightened fiduciary duty"1 ; (2)
enactment of special statutes; and (3) recognition of partnership qualities.2 .
Additionally, the California legislature recognizes the need to treat
close corporations differently than other corporations. 3 The Legislative
Committee Comment to California Corporations Code section 158 states the
legislature's intent in creating statutory close corporations under section 158
was to "recognize the unique characteristics" of close corporations." The
Comment also requires unanimous shareholder approval to become a statu-
tory close corporation after initial shares are issued because the shareholders
of close corporations "may be subject to burdens and liabilities not imposed
on other corporations.""5
Additionally, since close corporations are more like partnerships, there
are certain instances when shareholders should be treated like partners. For
88. See ROBERTW. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 373 (3d. ed. 1992).
89. See id.
90. See id. See also Kruger v. Gerth, 210 N.E.2d 355, 356 (N.Y. 1965) (Desmond, C.J.,
dissenting) ("small corporations, being really partnerships ... should be treated by a court of
equity as partnerships in many respects") and (Fuld, J., dissenting, concurring with Desmond,
C.J.) ("there is no inherent reason why a court of equity cannot treat the participant in a
genuine close corporation ... as partners").
91. This "heightened fiduciary duty" was recognized by the California Supreme Court in
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson, 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969). In Jones, the court held "majority
[shareholders] have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority shareholders and to the corpo-
ration to use their ability to control the corporation in a fair, just and equitable manner." Any
use to which the majority puts its power "must benefit all shareholders proportionately and
must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's business." Id. at 471.
92. See HAMILTON, supra note 88, at 373-74 (citing Kruger, 210 N.E.2d at 356-57). See
also Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 586 (111. 1964) ("[C]ourts can no longer fail to ...
distinguish between the close and public corporation when confronted with problems relating
to either."; recognizing need for separate statutory scheme governing close corporations);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (Mass. 1975) ("[the more rigorous duty
of partners" extends to shareholders in close corporations).
93. CAL. CoaP. CODE § 158 (West 1990). Subsection (g) defines statutory close corpo-
rations and refers to eleven other Corporation Code sections that specifically relate to close
corporations.
94. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 cmt. (West 1990). This comment recognizes that share-
holders of close corporations wish to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to al-
locate management responsibilities in a way that was previously only appropriate between
partners.
95. Id One example of an additional burden imposed on shareholders of close corpora-
tions is the frequency of "disregarding the corporate entity," discussed in greater detail, infra
Part IV. Basically, when the corporate entity is disregarded, shareholders may be held per-
sonally liable for the corporation's liabilities. Another example of an additional burden is the
increased fiduciary relationship owed to minority shareholders. See supra note 91.
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example, if a corporation is a Subchapter S"6 corporation, the corporation is
taxed like a partnership. As a result, in a Subchapter S corporation, corpo-
rate profits and losses "pass through" to the shareholders and are taxed at
the shareholders' individual tax rate."' Each shareholder reports his or her
share of the corporate profits and losses.9 The corporation is not taxed as
an entity."' As a result, the accuracy of the audit of a Subchapter S corpo-
ration is more important to its shareholders than audits performed for the
purpose of valuing a non-Subchapter S corporation.
Because of the enormous differences between shareholders of closely
held corporations and publicly held corporations and the judicial and legis-
lative recognition of the need to treat each entity differently, the Bily deci-
sion should not be binding on all corporate entities. The rules of privity
should apply only when dealing with large, publicly held corporations
where the shareholders are mere investors and have no involvement in the
daily operations of the business. Because closely held corporations, by their
nature, usually consist of a small and identifiable group of individuals, the
shareholders should be considered "clients" of the independent auditors
with standing to sue for professional negligence. At the very least, the dif-
ferences should give rise to other equitable considerations.
IV. REVERSE PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL
Considering the differences between closely held and publicly held
corporations, the California courts may find that the policies underlying the
rules of privity do not apply to shareholders of all types of corporations.
Courts should recognize and appreciate these differences and allow the
shareholders of small closely held corporations to disregard their corporate
entity where allowing the corporate fiction to remain would result in injus-
tice. This equitable doctrine is referred to as "reverse" piercing of the cor-
porate veil."'
96. A closely held corporation may elect Subchapter S status for tax purposes under
I.R.C. §§ 1362, 1372. In addition to being a closely held corporation, certain other criteria
must be met. These criteria are not important for purposes of this article and will not be dis-
cussed.
97. Although there are numerous differences between taxing partnerships and taxing
Subchapter S corporations, they are generally the same for purposes of this article. In taxing
a partnership, the partnership as an entity is not taxed, but rather the profits and losses "pass
through" the partners. The result is that individual partners are taxed based on their pro-rata
share of the business. See PAINTER, supra note 9, §1.10; CAVrrCH & CAvrrcH, supra note 9,
§§ 3.00, 3.01.
98. See PAuNTER, supra note 9, § 1.10; CAVrrCH & CATVCH, supra note 9, §§ 3.00, 3.01.
99. See PAINTER, supra note 9, § 1.10; CAvrrcH & CATViCH, supra note 9, §§ 3.00, 3.01.
100. See PAmIr, supra note 9, § 1.10; CAVrrCH & CATVICH, supra note 9, §§ 3.00,
3.01.
101. As will be discussed infra Part IV, a "reverse!' pierce allows the shareholder to dis-
regard the corporate entity so that the corporate entity no longer exists and all that remains is
the individual. Generally, "piercing the corporate veil" is reserved for the benefit of third
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Before discussing the mechanics of a reverse pierce, it is appropriate to
discuss the traditional "piercing of the corporate veil." One of the basic
purposes of corporate law is to protect corporate shareholders from personal
liability for the actions of the corporation beyond the shareholders' initial
capital contributions."°c Nevertheless, piercing the corporate veil is gener-
ally used to hold corporate shareholders personally liable for the acts of the
corporation. 3
There are two alternate doctrines' that allow a plaintiff to pierce the
corporate veil in order to collect personally from the shareholder: (1) the
"instrumentality" doctrine, and (2) the "alter-ego" doctrineY' Under the in-
strumentality doctrine the plaintiff must prove: (1) excessive control by the
defendant shareholder; (2) wrongful or inequitable conduct by the defendant
shareholder; and (3) a causal relationship between the control and wrongful
conduct and plaintiff's loss." Complete ownership of stock is not suffi-
cient, in and of itself, to pierce the corporate veil) °c Rather, there must be
"complete domination" of business practices regarding the specific transac-
tion such that the corporate entity has no existence or mind of its own."0 '
parties who have been injured by the directors or officers of a corporation who are protected
from personal liability by the corporate entity.
102. See MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1985).
103. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1036 (1991). When courts "pierce the corporate veil," they disregard the
separate entity that is the corporation and hold the shareholders personally responsible for the
corporation's actions.
104. There is also a third doctrine, the "identity" doctrine, but it adds little to the other
two theories. The "identity" doctrine requires a showing that there was: such unity of interest
and ownership that the independence of the corporation has ceased, and adherence to the fic-
tion of separate identity would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the eco-
nomic entity to escape liability arising out of one corporation for the benefit of the whole en-
terprise. See PHILuP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS (SUBSTANTIVE LAW),
§6.04 (1987) (citing Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967)).
105. See BLUMBiERG, supra note 104, § 6.01 at 111 &n.21.
106. See BLUMBERG, supra note 104, § 6.02 at 114.
107. See Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160 (7th Cir.
1963). See also U.S. v. Jon-T Chemical, 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985) ("one hundred
percent ownership and identity of directors and officers, even together, are an insufficient
basis for applying alter-ego theory to pierce the corporate veil").
108. See BLUMBERG, supra note 104, § 6.02 at 114; Jon-T Chemical, 768 F.2d at 691.
In determining the requisite degree of control, the court looks at numerous factors, including:
(1) parent corporation owns all or most of the subsidiary's stock; (2) parent and subsidiary
corporations have common directors or officers; (3) parent corporation finances the subsidi-
ary; (4) parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise
causes its incorporation; (5) subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; (6) subsidiary has sub-
stantially no business except with parent corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it
by the parent; (7) in the papers of the parent corporation, the subsidiary is described as a de-
partment or division of the parent corporation, or its business or financial responsibility is
referred to as the parent corporation's own; (8) parent corporation uses the property of the
subsidiary as its own; (9) directors of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest
of the subsidiary, but take their orders from the parent corporation in the parent corporation's
interest; and (10) subsidiary does not follow the formal legal requirements. See Steven, 324
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The control must be used to commit fraud or some other dishonest or unjust
act in violation of plaintiff's legal rights."° Further, the control and result-
ing breach of duty must proximately cause the plaintiff's injury or unjust
loss."'
The "alter-ago" doctrine is widely used in "intragroup""' liability cases.
Under this doctrine, piercing the corporate veil is proper when (1) such
unity of ownership and interest exists between the parent and subsidiary that
the two affiliated corporations are no longer separate and the subsidiary has
become an "alter-ego" of the parent, and (2) recognizing the companies as
separate entities would result in an injustice."' Because the issue of control
is generally considered under the first prong, this test is virtually indistin-
guishable from the test under the "instrumentality" doctrine."
Although the "instrumentality" and "alter-ego" doctrines are defined
and discussed separately, they are basically the same and most courts use
the terms interchangeably. 4 In a recent decision in Brenelli Amedeo v.
Bakara Furniture, Inc.,"5 one California Court of Appeal stated that the
purpose behind the alter ego doctrine was to declare the individual and the
corporation the same entity. The Brenelli court reiterated the rule originally
stated in Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett: 6
While it is the general rule that a corporation is an entity separate and dis-
tinct from its stockholders, with separate, distinct liabilities and obliga-
tions, nevertheless there is a well-recognized and firmly settled exception
F.2d at 160-61.
109. See BLUMGERO, supra note 104, § 6.02 at 114-15. A "wrong" can range from asset
stripping (C.M. Corp. v. Oberer Dev. Co., 631 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1980)) to creating a sub-
sidiary to insulate the parent corporation from liability (Parker v. Bell Asbestos, 607 F. Supp.
1397 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). Sometimes, though, a "wrong" is construed so broadly as require no
further finding than the cause of action itself. See Gorrill v. Icelandair/Flugleidir, 761 F.2d
847 (2d Cir. 1985).
110. Generally, defendant's insolvency satisfies this requirement. See BLUNBMERG, supra
note 104, § 6.02 at 114.
111. See id. § 6.03 at 118. Intragroup refers to situations involving a parent corporation
and its subsidiary. A parent corporation is a corporation that owns more than fifty percent of
the voting shares, or other controlling interest in another corporation, called the subsidiary.
See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
112. See RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1985).
113. See BLUNMERG, supra note 104, § 6.03.
114. While most courts and commentators treat "instrumentality" and "alter-ego" the
same, there is a distinction. "The difference is between saying that a corporation is the mere
department or instrument of its shareholder and saying that a shareholder and his corporation
are one." Richard S. Kohn, Comment, Alternate Methods of Piercing the Corporate Veil in
Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U.L.REV. 123, 137 and n.58 (1968). California adopted the
"alter-ego" theory in Minifie v. Rowley, 202 P. 673 (Cal. 1921). See Kohn, supra at 137.
Minifie distinguished between the "alter-ego" and "instrumentality," but no other California
cases recognize such a distinction. Id.
115. Brenelli Amedeo, S.P.A. v. Bakara Furniture, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 355 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994).
116. Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 227 P. 723, 731 (Cal. 1924).
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to this general rule, that, when necessary to redress fraud, protect the
rights of third persons, or prevent a palpable injustice, the law and equity
will intervene and cast aside the legal fiction of independent corporate
existence, as distinguished from those who hold and own the corporate
capital stock, and deal with the corporation and stockholders as identical
entities with identical duties and obligations. 7
Robert Thompson, a Professor of Law at Washington University, con-
ducted a study of approximately 1600 piercing of the corporate veil cases."'
Thompson analyzed the nature of the corporations 9 and reasons given by
the courts in deciding to allow or disallow piercing of the corporate veil.'
Thompson's study revealed that in those 1600 case studies, piercing oc-
cuffed only in close corporations and not in public corporations. 2'
In deciding whether or not to allow piercing of the corporate veil, the
courts seemed to look at (1) the number of shareholders," and (2) the role
of the shareholder.2 3 As a result, it appears that an individual shareholder
who is active in the management of a close corporation is infinitely more
likely to be subject to personal liability for corporate acts than the passive
investor of a public corporation. This is further evidence of the enormous
risks that shareholders of close corporations bear, and which shareholders of
public corporations do not similarly bear. Since the burdens and risks are
different, it seems unfair to subject close corporation shareholders to the
same rules regarding independent auditor's liability for negligent audits as
public corporation shareholders, especially when those rules result in a se-
vere injustice. Because a close corporation is more likely to have its corpo-
rate veil pierced, equity should allow a shareholder of a close corporation to
disregard the corporate entity when not allowing it would result in a grave
injustice.' 2
117. Brenelli, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355.
118. Thompson, supra note 103, at 1036-37 n.1, 1044 & n.47. Cases were selected by
searching WESTLAW through 1985 using the terms "piercing the corporate veil" and
"disregard! the corporate entity" as well as certain WESTLAW "key" numbers. A similar
search was conducted in LEXIS in 1990 with similar results. From an initial set of 2000
cases, those that did not address corporate law were eliminated. Factual data compiled from
the cases include: whether or not the court pierced the corporate veil; year; court; jurisdiction
of law being applied; number of shareholders in the corporation being pierced; whether a per-
son or an entity was behind the veil; the person or entity seeking the piercing; the substance
of the claim (i.e., contract, tort, criminal law or other statute). See id.
119. Close corporations versus public corporations.
120. See Thompson, supra note 103, at 1038-39.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1055 (where corporation had one shareholder, corporate veil pierced in
49.64% of cases; where corporation had two or three shareholders, corporate veil pierced in
46.22% of cases).
123. See id. at 1056 (where defendant was a passive investor rather than active in the
business as a director/officer, courts "almost always" found no liability).
124. See BLUMBERG, supra note 104, § 22.09 (recognizing "an enterprise treatment
should be available whenever it would implement the underlying policies of the law, includ-
ing implementation of the intent of the parties, and not be confined exclusively to protecting
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Unfortunately, courts rarely allow the corporate entity to be disregarded
for the benefit of its shareholders.'2 The underlying policy is that since the
shareholders chose the form of doing business, they should be held to the
consequences of their own choice."' Nonetheless, the courts have applied
"reverse" piercing of the corporate veil in some cases. The classic case of
"reverse" piercing of the corporate veil is Cargill v. Hedge.' In Cargill,
the trial court denied corporate shareholders a farm homestead exemption
because title to the farm was held in the corporate name. In allowing a re-
verse pierce of the corporate veil, the court looked at (1) the degree of iden-
tity between the shareholder and the corporation, (2) public policy and (3)
whether a pierce would harm others, such as creditors or other sharehold-
ers." The Cargill court allowed a "reverse" pierce so the individual share-
holder could claim the homestead exemption.1"
There are three general approaches to the doctrine of "reverse" piercing
of the corporate veil. 3 ' The majority view is that the corporation may not
disregard the entity for any reason.' One minority view allows a "reverse"
piercing of the corporate veil using the jurisdiction's traditional corporate
pierce test. Under this view, the court does not consider that the corpora-
tion is the party seeking to disregard its own entity. 3
Another minority view allows for a "reverse" piercing of the corporate
veil only if equity or public policy requires." In Barium Steel Corp. v.
Wiley,'35 the court held that the corporation and the individuals who own all
third parties"). See also COX ET AL., supra note 77, § 7.18 ("the overall question is not to
mechanically estop the corporation's stockholders from raising their own deficiencies as a
basis to disregard the entity they have created but to inquire whether a fairer resolution of the
dispute before the court is achieved if the corporation's shareholders are permitted to pierce
the veil").
125. See O'NEAL & THOmpSON, supra note 76, § 1.10.
126. See id See also Thompson, supra note 103, at 1058.
127. Cargill v. Hedge, 375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985).
128. See id at 479.
129. Corporations are not entitled to homestead exemptions because they are artificial
entities with no need for a dwelling. The court placed significance on the shareholders oper-
ating the farm as individuals, rather than as a business entity. The family lived on the farm.
Therefore, the only way to further the public policy behind the homestead exemption was to
disregard the corporate entity and allow the shareholders to claim the exemption. Further-
more, the court allocated the risk of default to the creditor, finding that he should have been
aware of the possibility of the homestead exemption when he extended the credit. See id.
130. See Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corpo-
ration Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 681 (1989).
131. See id at 683 (citing T.V.A. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 570 F. Supp. 462 (E. D. Tenn.
1983), affid 753 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1985)) (where court refused to pierce the corporate veil
between the two corporate entities, requiring them to "abide by their choice" of organization).
132. See id. at 685-86 (citing Crum v. Krol, 425 N.E.2d 1081, 1088-89 (Il. App. Ct.
1981)) ("reverse" pierce allowed because the same equitable considerations of preventing
injustice should apply when a third party attempts to use the corporate veil as a shield).
133. See id at 681.
134. See Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 108 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1954).
135. Id
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of its stock and assets may be treated as identical in appropriate cases where
"justice to all parties requires it.' ' 6 In Barium Steel, plaintiff purchased all
of the stock of defendant's corporation after defendant warranted that the
corporation owed no taxes. 37 -Subsequently, one of plaintiff's subsidiary
companies paid the taxes owed by the defendant's corporation.3 3 The de-
fendant claimed plaintiff could not recover from him because plaintiff suf-
fered no damages. However, the court held that plaintiff could sue defen-
dant for the taxes paid by plaintiffs subsidiary company."' The court
stated:
If no recovery can be had in the instant case against defendants, defen-
dants never will be liable for their breach ... because if [plaintiffs sub-
sidiary] sues defendants to recover [the money it paid to clear the tax
lien], the defendants can avoid liability by pleading there is no privity of
contract between [plaintiff's subsidiary] and themselves.'"
The Barium case is so factually similar to the situation presented in the
Smith case that the court should apply the reverse pierce in the Smith case
because, like Pennsylvania, California courts have also applied the reverse
pierce "broadly to protect the interests of shareholders or officers of the
corporation....
In Cooperman v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,'
the court disregarded the corporate entity so the sole shareholder of the cor-
poration would be eligible to receive unemployment benefits. In Cooper-
man, plaintiff was the president and sole shareholder of a corporation he
created on the advice of his attorney.'43 The corporation sold the talents and
expertise of its sole shareholder.'" During a time of unemployment, Coop-
erman sought unemployment benefits from the state, was denied, and ap-
pealed the denial. 4 The court, while recognizing the separateness of the
136. Id. at 341.
137. See id at 338-39.
138. See id. at 341.
139. See i4
140. Id. at 343. It is worth noting that Pennsylvania also follows "near privity" rules in
independent auditor liability. See, e.g., Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919).
141. 9 WKnIN SUMMARY OF CALWOaRA LAW Corporations § 23 (9th ed. 1989) (citing
Conway v. Citrus Belt Land Co., 271 P. 525, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928)) (corporate entity dis-
regarded to absolve corporation and directors from liability for violation of statute). But see
Western States Bankcard Assn. v. San Francisco, 561 P.2d 273, 279 (Cal. 1977) (corporate
entity not "disregarded to facilitate tax avoidance").
142. Cooperman v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 122 Cal. Rptr. 127 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975).
143. See id. at 129 & n.1. Cooperman incorporated on his attorney's advice to obtain
the benefits of limited liability. Cooperman testified he did not operate the business any dif-
ferently than when it was a sole proprietorship.
144. See id. at 129.
145. See id Cooperman was denied benefits because he was the president of a viable
corporation and, therefore, not unemployed.
[Vol. 34
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 34 [1997], No. 1, Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol34/iss1/15
1997] FATE OF SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 265
corporate entity, held that the entity may be disregarded to prevent fraud,
protect third parties or prevent a grave injustice.'" Ultimately, the court
held that the "alter-ego" doctrine applies in cases where the rights of the
shareholders are at issue. 7
To recover under this "alter-ego" theory, a shareholder must establish
that the "individuality and separateness of the corporation and the individual
have ended and that it would be unjust to persist in the recognition of a
separate entity."'' In Cooperman, the court held that if the corporation was
allowed to remain a separate entity, a "grave injustice" would be done to
Cooperman.'49 The court, therefore, allowed Cooperman to disregard the
corporate entity so he could obtain unemployment benefits.
While some argue that Cooperman is limited in scope because the case
deals with unemployment benefits,'50 another recent California case applied
the "reverse" pierce doctrine to a contract case.' In Lebastchi v. Superior
Court, the plaintiff sued defendant corporation and defendant shareholder
for a breach of contract.52 Defendant shareholder requested a change of
venue arguing that venue was proper in the county where he resided and not
in the county where the contract was executed and to be performed. 53 The
court held that, for purposes of venue, "[an] alter-ego allegation places the
individual in the same position as the corporation,[ i.e.,] as a party to the
contract.""' The court stated the alter-ego doctrine arises when plaintiff
claims defendant is "using the corporate form unjustly and in derogation of
plaintiff's interest."'55 The proper issue is whether in any particular case eq-
uity is best accomplished by disregarding the corporate entity. 56 As applied
to the Smith case, Accountants are attempting to use the corporate form
unjustly by claiming lack of privity, in derogation of the Smiths' interests.
By disregarding the corporate entity of Re-Comp, and holding the Smiths in
the same position as the corporation, the Smiths become parties to the con-
146. See id at 131.
147. See id (emphasis added).
148. See id at 131.
149. Id
150. Id at 132-33. It appears that Coopennan may be distinguishable from other cases
because it involved unemployment benefits and, therefore, other public policy issues come
into play. Because Cooperman involved an unemployed cameraman-director, the court con-
sidered the fact that unemployment was due to the "erratic" nature of the motion picture in-
dustry and not to Cooperman's lack of diligence in obtaining employment. The court also
considered that Cooperman received no compensation as president and had no managerial
responsibilities. IM
151. Lebastchi v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
152. Id at 789.
153. See id
154. Id at788.
155. Id. at790.
156. See id at 790 (citing 9 WrrmN SUMMARY OF CAUFORN A LAW, Corporations § 12
(9th ed. 1989)).
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tract and therefore have privity of contract with Accountants. As a result,
the Smiths can now maintain a cause of action against Accountants.
In California, cases like Coopernwn' and Lebastchi158 indicate the
court's willingness to disregard the corporate entity when continued recog-
nition of the corporate fiction will result in a "grave injustice" and to
"protect the interests of the shareholders." This equitable doctrine should be
available to shareholders of closely held corporations in jurisdictions re-
quiring strict privity in an action for independent auditor liability. One ma-
jor drawback of the "reverse pierce" is that it is an equitable doctrine avail-
able at the court's discretion. As such, it provides plaintiffs with less than
predictable results. However, there is some comfort in that California is a
jurisdiction that recognizes application of the doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the facts as presented in this article, it is clear that existing
California law does not provide the Smiths with an adequate remedy. Bily
has essentially eliminated any recovery for professional malpractice for
shareholders in small closely held corporations. This result is unjust since
justice is never served if the court cannot even consider the facts of a par-
ticular case, especially the special concerns of, in this instance, the small
closely held corporation. Finally, vesting the entire possibility of success
with the equitable remedy of "reverse" piercing of the corporate veil is
speculative at best. Without a substantive change in the law, the Smiths are
without a remedy for their $5 million loss caused solely by independent
auditor negligence.
Lori J. Lechner"
157. See Cooperman v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 122 Cal. Rptr. 127,
127 (Cal. Ct. App, 1975).
158. See Lebastchi, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787.
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